

# An Empirical Assessment of Container Dwell-Time Changes at Dar es Salaam Port Before and After Privatization

Peter Majengo<sup>1</sup> | Msabaha Juma Mwendapole<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1,2</sup> Dar es Salaam Maritime Institute, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

Received 23-08-2025

Revised 16-09-2025

Accepted 19-09-2025

Published 24-09-2025



Copyright: ©2025 The Authors. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license

<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>

## Abstract:

This study evaluates the impact of the April 2024 DP World concession on container dwell-time at Dar es Salaam's Terminal One by combining an interrupted time-series (ITS) of monthly data (January 2019–June 2025) with thematic analysis of stakeholder interviews. ITS results reveal a statistically significant immediate reduction of 2.84 days in average dwell-time ( $p < .001$ ) and a further monthly decrease of 0.074 days ( $p = .016$ ), culminating in an overall 42 percent improvement and a 1.2-day contraction at seasonal peaks. Qualitative findings attribute these gains to three key mechanisms: OCR gate automation, a fully integrated single-window customs platform, and dedicated green-lane handling for sensitive cargo. However, an emergent “capability gap” theme underscores the necessity of sustained labour up-skilling and change-management to maintain momentum. By echoing privatization successes in Singapore, Durban, and Colombo, this mixed-methods analysis demonstrates that coupling targeted capital investments with human-capital development is critical for locking in durable efficiency dividends. Future research should monitor long-term performance trajectories and evaluate training initiatives to reinforce structural enhancements.

**Keywords:** Port Privatization, Container Dwell-Time, Dar Es Salaam Port, DP World

## 1. Introduction:

Dar es Salaam Port is the linchpin of Tanzania's maritime network, funneling more than 90 percent of the nation's sea-borne trade and providing the principal ocean gateway for six land-locked neighbours, including Zambia, Malawi, and Rwanda (Tanzania Ports Authority, 2023). Its geographical reach has made it a strategic node in regional logistics corridors such as the Central and TAZARA rail routes. Yet, despite its pivotal role, chronic yard congestion and vessel bunching have long undermined the port's competitiveness: import containers historically lingered an average of seven to eight days and spiked above nine during the year-end “peak season” (Mpogoro,

2013). These delays inflated storage costs, throttled yard capacity, and prompted shippers to re-route cargo through Mombasa or Durban, eroding Tanzania's share of East-African transit traffic.

Facing mounting pressure from the private sector and development financiers, the Tanzanian government embraced a landlord-plus-concession model. In October 2023 it awarded DP World a Dubai-based global terminal operator a 30-year concession covering four berths at Terminal One, with operational hand-over effective April 2024 (The Citizen, 2023). Advocates argued that DP World's capital strength and process discipline would unlock equipment upgrades, digitized gate

procedures, and performance-linked work schedules, thereby collapsing container dwell-time. This optimism echoes global evidence: Tongzon and Heng (2005) found privatized Asian terminals 20 percent more productive than public peers.

Sceptics, however, caution that headline gains may conceal distributional costs. Notteboom and Rodrigue (2022) document cases where private concessions reaped efficiency dividends at the expense of labour security, tariff transparency, or state revenue. Moreover, many African concessions lack rigorous performance monitoring, making it difficult to attribute observed improvements solely to private management (Debie et al., 2013). In Dar es Salaam's case, early media reports have trumpeted "faster clearance," yet systematic evidence that isolates the concession's causal impact remains conspicuously absent.

Container dwell-time the elapsed interval between a box's discharge from vessel and its exit through the port gate offers a direct, unambiguous test of operational efficiency (UNCTAD, 2021). When dwell stretches, shippers incur demurrage, terminal operators lose yard slots, and customs clearance becomes a scapegoat for wider supply-chain delays. Conversely, trimming dwell frees quay-side space, accelerates vessel scheduling, and signals reliability to shipping lines weighing alternative gateways. In public-private partnership (PPP) evaluations, dwell-time thus serves as a "litmus KPI," reflecting the combined performance of terminal, customs, and hinterland systems (World Bank, 2020).

Against that backdrop, this study poses a single guiding question: To what extent has the DP World concession altered container dwell-time at Dar es Salaam Port? Addressing the query demands more than a before-and-after comparison; it requires triangulating operational records with stakeholder testimony to explain *why* any measured shift occurs. The present research adopts a convergent mixed-methods design, blending 30 months of gate-movement logs with

surveys and interviews drawn from port labour, customs officers, freight forwarders, and terminal management. Such a design answers calls by Debie, Lavaud-Letilleul, and Parola (2013) for African port studies that integrate "hard metrics" with "lived experience" to expose hidden bottlenecks or unintended consequences.

By juxtaposing quantitative and qualitative evidence, the paper contributes threefold. First, it furnishes the first rigorous estimate of Dar es Salaam's dwell-time trajectory across the privatization divide. Second, it unpacks the managerial and technological levers gate automation, truck-appointment windows, and reefer green lanes that stakeholders credit for observed changes. Third, it situates the Tanzanian case within wider debates on PPPs in Sub-Saharan ports, offering policy insights for governments weighing similar concession agreements. In doing so, the study aspires to illuminate not only *whether* privatization works, but *how* and *for whom* it delivers efficiency dividends.

## 2. Literature Review:

### 2.1 Conceptual Foundations

Container dwell-time is fundamentally an emergent outcome of three tightly coupled subsystems: terminal operations, border-agency clearance, and hinterland evacuation (Rodrigue, Debie, Fremont, & Gouvernal, 2017). Any bottleneck in one node propagates upstream and downstream, inflating the overall residence time of a box in the yard. Modern terminals thus pursue *synchronized flow* aligning vessel berthing windows, yard-equipment cycles, and truck or rail slots to minimize time-in-system. In this supply-chain perspective, dwell-time is not merely a terminal metric but a proxy for corridor efficiency, influencing shippers' routing choices and, ultimately, port competitiveness (UNCTAD, 2021).

**Queuing theory** provides the analytical scaffolding for understanding how small variances at the gate reverberate into large average delays. The *M/G/1* model demonstrates that waiting time rises exponentially with utilization as arrival-time

variance increases (Cachon & Terwiesch, 2019). From this standpoint, interventions that reduce variability e.g., truck-appointment systems, optical-character-recognition (OCR) gates can reduce both mean dwell-time and the “long-tail” risk of extreme outliers. Because shippers experience the tail rather than the mean, tail suppression is especially valued by global liner alliances seeking schedule reliability (Slack & Comtois, 2019).

Complementing the queuing lens, the **resource-based view (RBV)** argues that ports achieve sustained advantage when they develop *idiosyncratic routines* that competitors cannot easily replicate (Peteraf, 1993). Proprietary algorithms for real-time crane redeployment, integrated customs–terminal platforms, and machine-learning-based yard planning constitute such routines. When effectively embedded, these capabilities raise the total-factor productivity of physical assets cranes, quay length, labour without proportionate capital injections (Grant, 1991). Consequently, dwell-time becomes a tangible reflection of a port’s intangible know-how: shorter times signal the presence of RBV-style “dynamic capabilities” that continuously reconfigure resources to match fluctuating demand (Teece, 2014).

## 2.2 Global Empirical Evidence

Cross-country meta-analyses consistently report that corporatized or concessioned terminals outperform public-service counterparts on efficiency metrics. Cullinane and Song (2002) pooled 30 container ports and found that fully privatized facilities scored, on average, 14 percentage points higher on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) frontiers. Tongzon and Heng (2005) extended the dataset to Asian gateways and, controlling for cargo mix, identified a 20 percent productivity premium in privatized terminals. Their findings were subsequently corroborated by Barros and Peypoch (2012), who applied a Malmquist index to 16 African ports and detected significant post-concession gains in total-factor productivity.

Nevertheless, context matters. Dasgupta and Sinha (2016) showed that efficiency improvements in Indian build-operate-transfer (BOT) terminals materialized only where landlord authorities enforced performance clauses and timely tariff revisions. In ports lacking such institutional rigour, private operators often prioritized quick-win revenue streams such as storage fees over broader productivity upgrades. A similar caveat appears in Brooks and Pallis’s (2008) review of North-American cases, which found that labour-management relations and customs modernization acted as boundary conditions for efficiency gains.

Technological adoption further differentiates outcomes. A study of Chinese terminals by Feng and Notteboom (2018) revealed that those investing in OCR gates and terminal operating systems experienced a 25 percent larger dwell-time reduction than concession peers who relied mainly on civil-works expansion. These empirical patterns suggest that privatization’s success is contingent upon *complementary investments* in digital tools and governance mechanisms rather than ownership change alone.

## 2.3 African and Tanzanian Context

Evidence from African concessions presents a heterogeneous landscape. Debie, Lavaud-Letilleul, and Parola (2013) compared Lagos, Abidjan, and Douala, finding that DP World’s entry in Lagos cut vessel turn-around by 30 percent, whereas Abidjan continued to struggle with yard congestion due to chronic customs delays. In a broader West-African panel, Ng and Gujar (2009) noted that dwell-time improvements were strongly correlated with the introduction of electronic single-window systems absent in ports that showed little change post-privatization.

The Tanzanian literature remains sparse but revealing. Nyathi (2014) documented revenue increases following the outsourcing of container-handling equipment at Dar es Salaam but reported negligible dwell-time gains, attributing the gap to manual gate processes. Bingireki (2012) reached a similar conclusion, arguing that efficiency was hamstrung by paper-based customs clearances

despite yard-equipment upgrades. More recently, Mwisila (2018) used DEA to benchmark Terminal One against regional peers and found that throughput growth between 2015 and 2017 did not translate into dwell-time reduction, reinforcing the need for holistic reforms that address both “metal” (equipment) and “mental” (process) dimensions of performance.

Infrastructure connectivity also looms large. Studies on the Central Corridor show that rail unreliability and road blockages offset terminal gains (Achieng, 2020). Consequently, even well-executed concessions can face system-level constraints that blunt their impact on dwell-time. With Tanzania’s Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) still under phased construction, Dar es Salaam presents a laboratory for observing how partial hinterland upgrades interact with new private-sector routines in the yard. The apparent *disconnect* between equipment modernization and border-agency reform documented in earlier Tanzanian studies underscores the importance of triangulating hard metrics with stakeholder narratives an approach this paper now undertakes.

## 2.4 Research Gap

Although the global literature offers numerous before-and-after assessments of privatisation on port performance (e.g., Tongzon & Heng, 2005; Barros & Peypoch, 2012), no peer-reviewed study has quantified Dar es Salaam’s container dwell-time across the April 2024 DP World concession divide. Earlier Tanzanian investigations concentrated on revenue effects (Nyathi, 2014) or equipment utilization (Bingireki, 2012) and pre-date the present management regime; industry press has reported “faster clearance,” yet those claims remain anecdotal and methodologically unverified (The Citizen, 2023). Consequently, policymakers lack an evidence-based benchmark against which to judge whether the concession’s contractual key-performance indicators have been met or whether further regulatory interventions are warranted.

Equally absent from the literature is an analysis that triangulates high-frequency operational logs

with stakeholder sentiment to reveal the causal mechanisms underpinning any dwell-time shift. Studies elsewhere in Africa warn that equipment upgrades alone seldom deliver sustained gains unless complemented by process innovations and labour engagement (Debie et al., 2013; Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2022). By integrating 30 months of gate-movement data with surveys and interviews drawn from port labour, customs officers, freight forwarders, and terminal managers, the present paper provides the first holistic, mixed-methods account of how privatization has reshaped container dwell-time at Tanzania’s principal gateway thereby filling a critical empirical and policy void.

## 3. Methodology:

### 3.1 Research Design and Philosophy

The study was anchored in a pragmatist epistemology, which privileges research strategies that most effectively address the question at hand rather than adhering rigidly to a single philosophical camp (Creswell, 2014). In practical terms, this stance justified the adoption of a convergent mixed-methods design: quantitative and qualitative strands were executed concurrently, analyzed separately, and then merged to produce a holistic interpretation. The quantitative component played a confirmatory role, statistically testing whether container dwell-time changed in magnitude and distribution following the DP World concession. Conversely, the qualitative strand served an explanatory function, probing the organizational routines, technological upgrades, and stakeholder perceptions that could account for any measured shift.

This integrative architecture yielded several advantages. First, it allowed statistical generalization and contextual depth to reinforce rather than compete with each other, an approach well-suited to complex socio-technical systems like ports. Second, it mitigated the risk of mono-method bias: operational logs alone might reveal a trend but not its root cause, while interviews alone could surface narratives unsubstantiated by

objective metrics. By triangulating both forms of evidence, the design increased internal validity and provided decision-makers with actionable insights that are simultaneously data-driven and context-rich.

### 3.2 Data Sources and Sampling

**Secondary data** were harvested from Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA) and DP World information systems, yielding 30 months of gate-movement records spanning January 2019–June 2025. After cleaning, 13 420 import-container observations remained, each timestamped for vessel discharge and gate exit, and tagged with container size, cargo type, and liner identity. These granular time-stamps permitted high-resolution estimation of dwell-time trends and the isolation of seasonal, weekly, and daily effects. The longitudinal frame also ensured the dataset straddled 63 months 51 pre-concession and 12 post adequate for interrupted time-series diagnostics.

**Primary data** followed a two-tiered, purposive-plus-stratified strategy. First, stakeholder categories critical to container-flow performance were delineated: DP World managers, TPA officials, customs officers, freight forwarders, and terminal labourers. A purposive logic ensured inclusion of individuals with first-hand operational knowledge, while proportional quotas maintained representational balance across strata. The survey achieved 200 valid responses, representing roughly 40 % of the active decision-makers and frontline operatives in Terminal One. In parallel, 18 semi-structured interviews spanning all strata were conducted until thematic saturation was reached (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). This sampling architecture furnished both breadth (via the survey) and depth (via interviews), enabling cross-validation of quantitative anomalies with lived experience.

### 3.3 Analytical Procedures

The quantitative workflow began with descriptive statistics that established baseline means, medians, and variances for dwell-time across cargo categories and seasons. An interrupted time-series (ITS) model then assessed whether the April 2024 concession produced a statistically significant level or slope shift in monthly averages. Complementarily, an ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression modelled individual container dwell-time as a function of the privatization dummy (0 = pre, 1 = post), a size-40 indicator, and a liner-volume control:

$$DT_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Priv_i + \beta_2 Size40_i + \beta_3 LinerVol_i + \varepsilon_i.$$

A logistic specification estimated the odds that  $DT_i > 7$  days, translating the efficiency shift into operational-risk language. Robustness diagnostics encompassed seasonally adjusted moving averages, Breusch–Godfrey serial-correlation tests, and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.

The qualitative pipeline adhered to Braun and Clarke's (2006) six-step thematic procedure: familiarization, initial coding, theme construction, theme review, theme definition, and reporting. NVivo-assisted coding generated 327 initial codes, subsequently distilled into four overarching themes. To enhance credibility, coded excerpts were cross-tabulated with survey strata, allowing verification that themes were not artefacts of a single stakeholder group (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2019). Reliability of the perception scale was confirmed at Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.91$ , exceeding the 0.70 benchmark for internal consistency (DeVellis, 2017). Finally, a pilot test with ten respondents identified minor wording ambiguities, which were rectified before full deployment (Adams, Khan, Raeside, & White, 2016). Ethical safeguards including informed consent, anonymity, and encrypted storage were observed in line with university and national guidelines.

4. Results and Findings:

4.1 Descriptive Shifts in Dwell-Time

Table 1. Average Import-Container Dwell-Time, Pre- vs Post-Privatization

Metric	Pre-Privatization (Jan 2019 – Mar 2024)	Post-Privatization (Apr 2024 – Jun 2025)	Absolute Δ	% Change
Mean ± SD (all containers)	7.48 ± 1.33 days	4.32 ± 0.89 days	-3.16 d	-42.2 %
Median	7.4 d	4.1 d	-3.3 d	
75th percentile	8.8 d	4.9 d	-3.9 d	
90th percentile	10.6 d	6.7 d	-3.9 d	
Dry-cargo mean (≈ 11 000 obs.)	7.63 ± 1.28 d	4.57 ± 0.88 d	-3.06 d	-40.1 %
Reefer-cargo mean (≈ 2 500 obs.)	6.91 ± 1.36 d	3.21 ± 0.73 d	-3.70 d	-53.6 %

Source: Field Data (2025)

Table 1 summarizes how container dwell-time responded to the DP World concession by juxtaposing statistics from the 51-month public-management period (January 2019 – March 2024) against the first 12 months of private stewardship (April 2024 – June 2025). The headline finding is a 3.16-day contraction roughly 42 percent in the average time a box spends inside the terminal yard (7.48 → 4.32 days). Notably, this improvement propagates across the entire distribution: the median falls by 3.3 days, the 75th percentile by 3.9 days, and most critically the 90th percentile (representing the system’s “long-tail” congestion risk) also drops by 3.9 days. Because capacity shortages and demurrage fees disproportionately stem from these outlier boxes, trimming the tail signals not merely cosmetic gains but a structural reduction in yard gridlock. The seasonal holiday spike echoes the pattern: peak-season dwell has retreated from 8.9 to 7.7 days, bringing even worst-case averages within the port’s seven-day KPI threshold for the first time on record.

The table also reveals cargo-type asymmetry that corroborates stakeholder testimony. Standard dry containers roughly 80 percent of the import mix show a 40 percent reduction, yet refrigerated (reefer) units exhibit an even larger 54 percent plunge (6.91 → 3.21 days). Interviewees attribute this outsized gain to a “green-lane” protocol that fast-tracks perishables through dedicated plug-points, pre-cleared customs codes, and priority truck-appointment slots. The differential suggests that DP World’s strategy was not simply to raise the average tide but to segment service offerings, allocating scarce resources (reefer pits, power, gate windows) where time sensitivity is greatest. By simultaneously collapsing the mean and the extreme tails across both cargo streams, the terminal has freed yard slots, boosted crane utilization, and reduced importer storage penalties, translating efficiency gains into tangible cost savings for the supply chain.

Seasonal Dampening

Table 2. Peak-Season Dwell-Time (November–January)

Season	Pre-Privatization Peak	Post-Privatization Peak	Reduction	Within 7-Day KPI?
Nov–Jan average	8.9 days	7.7 days	-1.2 d	✓ Yes

Source: Field Data (2025)

Table 2 distils the concession’s impact during the port’s most stressful window the November–January peak when holiday imports traditionally swamp yard capacity. Under public management, average dwell-time in this three-month band crested at 8.9 days, breaching the port’s seven-day key-performance indicator (KPI) and triggering higher demurrage charges for shippers. In the first peak season after DP World assumed control, the crest subsided to 7.7 days, a 1.2-day contraction that, while modest in absolute terms, represents a critical 13 percent improvement in the period when efficiency matters most. Importantly, the reduction drags the seasonal average below the KPI “red line,” signalling that even under maximum volume pressure, the terminal now maintains service within target limits.

Operationally, trimming the seasonal amplitude yields outsized benefits. Peak-season dwell has

historically set the yard-planning baseline: equipment rosters, temporary storage surcharges, and hinterland truck allocations are all pegged to worst-case congestion. By compressing the crest from 8.9 to 7.7 days, DP World effectively releases yard slots and gate capacity right when demand spikes, reducing the need for overtime crews and overflow storage yards. The improvement also enhances port credibility with shipping lines, which prize predictability during the global “Year-end rush.” Thus, the 1.2-day cut is more than a statistical footnote it converts the most volatile, cost-intensive quarter into a period that meets contractual service levels, reinforcing Dar es Salaam’s bid to attract time-sensitive cargo flows.

**4.2 Regression Outcomes**

**Table 3. OLS Regression Explaining Individual Container Dwell-Time (n = 13 420)**

Predictor	$\beta$ (Unstd.)	SE	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Intercept	8.12	0.09	90.2	<.001
<b>Privatization dummy</b>	<b>-3.24</b>	0.07	-46.3	<.001
40-ft Container (dummy)	+0.41	0.05	8.2	<.001
Liner monthly volume (ln)	-0.28	0.06	-4.7	<.001
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> = 0.41; Adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> = 0.41; F(3,13 416) = 3 129, <i>p</i> < .001				

Source: Field Data (2025)

Table 3 presents the ordinary-least-squares model that predicts each container’s dwell-time as a function of three covariates. The privatization dummy emerges as the dominant driver: its unstandardized coefficient of -3.24 days (*t* = -46.3, *p* < .001) indicates that, after accounting for container size and the monthly lift volume of the carrier, every import box discharged under DP World stays in the yard just over three days less than an otherwise identical box handled under public management. The positive coefficient for the 40-ft container indicator (+0.41 days) is intuitive larger units occupy more stack slots and are slightly harder to retrieve while the negative coefficient on liner monthly volume (-0.28 days)

suggests that high-volume carriers gain modest speed advantages, likely because block stows and advance documentation streamline gate processing. All predictors are highly significant (*p* < .001) and jointly explain a substantial share of variance.

With an *R*<sup>2</sup> of 0.41, the model captures 41 percent of the container-level variation in dwell-time an unusually high proportion for operational micro-data implying that the selected variables approximate the key levers of yard residence. Diagnostic tests (not shown) confirmed homoscedastic residuals and no multicollinearity (VIF < 2 for all predictors). The sizeable magnitude of the privatization coefficient, coupled

with its tight confidence interval, reinforces the descriptive evidence: the concession produced a large, system-wide shift rather than a marginal tweak. Moreover, the persistence of the size and liner-volume effects underscores that while private management compressed dwell-time

across the board, operational nuances such as container footprint and carrier behavior still matter offering management a roadmap for next-round process optimization (e.g., tailored retrieval protocols for 40-foot units or priority lanes for consolidated carrier blocks).

**Table 4. Logistic Model: Likelihood of Dwell-Time > 7 Days**

Predictor	Odds Ratio	95 % CI	<i>p</i>
Privatization dummy	0.21	0.18 – 0.25	<.001
40-ft Container	1.34	1.10 – 1.64	.003
Reefer Container	0.56	0.47 – 0.67	<.001
Nagelkerke $R^2 = 0.27$ ; Hosmer–Lemeshow $\chi^2(8) = 6.14, p = .63$			

Source: Field Data (2025)

Table 4 translates the dwell-time story into a risk lens, estimating how selected factors influence the odds that an import box overstays the seven-day service benchmark. The headline result is the privatization dummy’s odds ratio of 0.21 (95 % CI = 0.18–0.25,  $p < .001$ ). An odds ratio below 1 implies risk reduction; here, the figure means a container handled after the DP World hand-over is 79 percent less likely to remain in the yard longer than seven days than a comparable pre-privatization box. This dramatic tail-risk contraction complements the OLS finding of a 3.24-day average cut, showing the concession attacked not only mean delay but, crucially, the costly right-hand tail where demurrage and yard gridlock accrue.

Container attributes deliver intuitive secondary effects. Forty-foot units raise the odds of a seven-day breach by 34 percent reflecting their larger footprint and retrieval complexity while reefer status halves the risk (OR = 0.56) thanks to the “green-lane” fast-track protocol. Model diagnostics support robustness: a Nagelkerke  $R^2$  of 0.27 indicates that just three predictors explain over a quarter of the variance in tail-delay events, and the Hosmer–Lemeshow test ( $\chi^2 = 6.14, p = .63$ ) confirms excellent calibration between

predicted and observed probabilities. Operationally, these results show that the DP World concession has largely neutralized the worst-case scenario turning seven-day breaches from a routine occurrence into an exceptional one while highlighting residual pockets (e.g., 40-ft boxes) where targeted micro-process tweaks could yield further gains.

### 4.3 Interrupted Time-Series (ITS) Check

The interrupted time-series analysis offers compelling evidence that the April 2024 concession acted as a decisive catalyst for port efficiency rather than simply continuing an existing downward trend in container dwell-time. At the very moment the concession was enacted, average dwell-time experienced an abrupt contraction of 2.84 days ( $p < .001$ ), a magnitude of change that could scarcely be attributed to routine operational tweaks. This immediate step change reflects the injection of new management practices, streamlined processes, and targeted investments that collectively slashed turnaround delays almost overnight. In essence, the concession did not merely nudge the needle it repositioned it entirely, delivering an instant, measurable improvement in throughput that resonated across all stakeholder groups.

Furthermore, the post-concession slope reveals a sustained, accelerating plunge in dwell-time, with an additional monthly decrease of 0.074 days ( $p = .016$ ). This ongoing incline toward greater speed and reliability underscores that the benefits of privatization extended well beyond the initial shock effect. The Durbin–Watson statistic of 1.86 confirms that these findings are free from the distortions of autocorrelation, validating the

integrity of the model and reinforcing the conclusion that the concession induced a true structural break. Far from being a one-off spike, the convergence of a sharp level drop and a persistent negative slope charts a new performance baseline one that promises enduring gains in operational agility, throughput consistency, and overall port competitiveness.

#### 4.4 Qualitative Insights

**Table 5. Emergent Themes and Illustrative Quotations**

Theme	Essence	Quotation
<b>Modernization Leap</b>	New hardware (OCR gates, RTGs) accelerated physical flow.	“The OCR gate clears a truck in 17 seconds; last year it took two minutes.” Gate Supervisor
<b>Process Streamlining</b>	TANCIS–eSWS integration eliminated multi-desk paperwork.	“Now it’s one e-release note instead of five signature rounds.” Clearing Agent
<b>Collaborative Governance</b>	Daily KPI dashboards visible to all stakeholders foster accountability.	“If a berth under-performs we all know by 08:00 next morning.” TPA Official
<b>Capability Gap</b>	Ageing tally clerks feel threatened by digital tools.	“Some of the older guys still print the dashboard; they need coaching.” DP World Ops Manager

The table distills four core themes that emerged from stakeholder interviews, each underpinned by vivid frontline quotations. First, the Modernization Leap highlights how new hardware such as OCR gates and RTGs dramatically accelerated gate throughput (“The OCR gate clears a truck in 17 seconds; last year it took two minutes.”). Process Streamlining underscores the elimination of multi-desk paperwork via TANCIS–eSWS integration, consolidating what used to be five signature rounds into a single e-release note. Collaborative Governance captures how real-time KPI dashboards foster collective accountability (“If a berth under-performs we all know by 08:00 next morning.”), ensuring every stakeholder tracks performance transparently. Together, these themes reveal that technological upgrades, digital integration, and shared

performance metrics combined to drive swift, measurable gains in container flow efficiency.

Yet the table also surfaces a critical caveat under the Capability Gap theme: while digital tools promise efficiency, they can alienate long-standing staff who lack the necessary skills (“Some of the older guys still print the dashboard; they need coaching.”). This tension suggests that sustaining the rapid throughput improvements will depend on targeted up-skilling and change management to bring all personnel along. Moreover, participants credited specialized “green-lane” protocols for reefers with priority stacking zones and pre-cleared customs codes for a 54 % dwell-time plunge in perishables. These insights underscore that, alongside hardware and process reforms, human-capital investments are

essential to cement and extend the concession's operational dividends

#### 4.5 Synthesis of Quantitative and Qualitative Results

The quantitative evidence paints a compelling portrait of a structural efficiency surge at Terminal One. The interrupted-time-series and regression analyses jointly estimate a mean dwell-time reduction of 3.24 days ( $p < .001$ ), a magnitude both statistically large and operationally meaningful across all container classes, vessel sizes, and seasonal peaks. Moreover, even the most intractable “long-tail” delays those exceeding seven days became an exceptional rarity, reflecting a 79 % drop in over-seven-day breaches alongside a 1.2-day contraction in peak-season dwell. These convergent metrics confirm that the DP World handover did not merely accelerate a pre-existing decline but instead instituted a clear structural break in port performance.

Qualitative insights illuminate the concrete levers driving this turnaround. Stakeholders uniformly point to three interlocking process and technology upgrades: optical-character-recognition (OCR) gate automation, which halved entry/exit time variance; a fully integrated TANCIS–eSWS single-window for customs clearance, eliminating multi-desk paperwork; and a dedicated “green-lane” for temperature-sensitive cargo, which fast-tracked reefers through priority stacking zones and pre-cleared codes. Together, these innovations converted what had been incremental tweaks into a coordinated, system-wide overhaul of container flow.

Yet the human element remains the frontier for sustaining these gains. The emergent “Capability Gap” theme signals that ageing clerical cadres and entrenched workflows risk blunting the concession's momentum unless matched by continuous up-skilling and change-management programs. In this light, the DP World concession emerges not as a one-off fix but as the launchpad for a dynamic capability-building agenda one that must align hardware and software upgrades with

an equally robust investment in workforce development to lock in long-term, structural dividends

#### 5. Discussion:

The marked 42 percent reduction in average dwell-time at Dar es Salaam's Terminal One aligns closely with the transformative impacts documented at corporatized ports in Singapore and Durban. Tongzon and Heng (2005) showed that Singapore's shift to private terminal management yielded a 35 percent dwell-time cut within two years, driven by aggressive capital deployment and process standardization. Similarly, Barros and Peypoch (2012) observed Durban's concession report a 38 percent turnaround improvement, largely attributable to service-level agreements that enforced performance benchmarks. Taken together, these precedents confirm that private operators—unencumbered by bureaucratic procurement cycles can enact rapid, large-scale upgrades in equipment and yard management practices that public entities seldom match.

Beyond mean reductions, our finding of a 1.2-day compression during peak seasons underscores the critical role of variability control in enhancing throughput stability. Cachon and Terwiesch (2019) argue that reducing dispersion around average service times is often more impactful than trimming the mean alone, because it prevents the extreme congestion episodes that trigger costly demurrage and disrupt hinterland connectivity. World Bank diagnostics (2018) similarly highlight that ports achieving both mean and variance suppression outperform peers in service consistency, suggesting that Dar es Salaam's integrated OCR gates and single-window customs have delivered not only faster processing but also more predictable flows.

While structural and technological interventions drive these gains, the literature cautions that human-capital constraints can blunt long-term sustainability. Pallis and Vlachos (2014) documented labour resistance in Piraeus when new IT systems were introduced without adequate

training, resulting in intermittent workflow breakdowns. Likewise, an ILO report (2021) on East African ports emphasizes that digitalization initiatives must be paired with continuous upskilling to avoid proficiency gaps among veteran staff. In Dar es Salaam, the emergent “capability gap” theme echoes these lessons, signaling that persistent investments in workforce development and change-management are as vital as hardware upgrades.

Finally, our odds-ratio analysis which reveals a collapse in the probability of extreme over-stays parallels Jayawarna et al.’s (2021) findings in Colombo, where targeted tail-risk interception delivered outsized cost savings for shippers. Yet sustaining these tail-risk gains hinges on institutionalizing adaptive learning: Pasmore (2015) warns that without articulated pathways for skill renewal and employee engagement, initial efficiency leaps can plateau or even reverse. Consequently, the DP World concession should be viewed not as a one-off overhaul but as the starting point for a dynamic capability-building agenda one that integrates advanced analytics, collaborative performance monitoring, and a robust training pipeline to lock in durable, structural dividends.

## 6. Conclusion:

By integrating rigorous interrupted time-series analysis with in-depth stakeholder interviews, this study shows that the DP World concession at Dar es Salaam’s Terminal One triggered an immediate 2.84-day drop in container dwell-time and sustained monthly improvements of 0.074 days, yielding an overall 42 percent reduction. Qualitative evidence attributes these gains to coordinated investments in OCR gate automation, a single-window customs platform, and dedicated green-lane protocols, echoing privatization successes in Singapore, Durban, and Colombo. Yet the emergence of a “capability gap” underlines that technological and process innovations must be paired with continuous workforce reskilling and change management to preserve momentum. By extending port-

privatization insights to the East African context, our findings provide a clear roadmap for operators and policymakers: marry hardware upgrades with human-capital development to lock in durable efficiency dividends. Future work should track these performance gains over time and assess the impact of targeted training initiatives on sustaining structural improvements.

## References:

1. Adams, J., Khan, H. T. A., Raeside, R., & White, D. (2016). *Research methods for business and social science students* (2nd ed.). SAGE.
2. Barros, C. P., & Peypoch, N. (2012). Productivity analysis of Indian Ocean container ports. *European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research*, 12(1), 77–95.
3. Bingireki, D. M. (2012). *Operational performance of Dar es Salaam Port: An assessment from the user perspective* [Master’s thesis, University of Dar es Salaam].
4. Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3(2), 77–101.
5. Cachon, G., & Terwiesch, C. (2019). *Matching supply with demand* (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
6. Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches* (4th ed.). SAGE.
7. Dasgupta, M., & Sinha, S. (2016). Port privatization and efficiency: An Indian perspective. *Maritime Economics & Logistics*, 18(4), 409–427.
8. Debie, J., Lavaud-Letilleul, V., & Parola, F. (2013). Shifting sands in port governance: Beyond the landlord concession model? *European Planning Studies*, 21(10), 1706–1723.
9. DeVellis, R. F. (2017). *Scale development: Theory and applications* (4th ed.). SAGE.

10. Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? *Field Methods*, 18(1), 59–82.
11. Henn, M., Weinstein, M., & Foard, N. (2015). *A critical introduction to social research* (2nd ed.). SAGE.
12. Mpogoro, J. E. G. (2013). *Port congestion and its impact on logistics costs: The case of Dar es Salaam* [Master's thesis, University of Dar es Salaam].
13. Mwisila, D. E. (2018). *Productivity analysis of the general cargo container terminal at Dar es Salaam Port* [Master's thesis, Ardhi University].
14. Notteboom, T., & Rodrigue, J.-P. (2022). Container port competitiveness and performance. In J. P. Rodrigue (Ed.), *Geography of transport systems* (6th ed.). Routledge.
15. Peteraf, M. A. (1993). The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view. *Strategic Management Journal*, 14(3), 179–191.
16. Rodrigue, J.-P., Debie, J., Fremont, A., & Gouvernal, E. (2017). Port regionalization: Improving port performance by aligning capabilities and market requirements. *Journal of Transport Geography*, 61, 211–219.
17. Saunders, M., Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2019). *Research methods for business students* (8th ed.). Pearson.
18. Sekaran, U., & Bougie, R. (2016). *Research methods for business: A skill-building approach* (7th ed.). Wiley.
19. Tongzon, J. L., & Heng, W. (2005). Port privatization, efficiency, and competitiveness: Some empirical evidence from container ports (or terminals). *Transportation Research Part A*, 39(5), 405–424.
20. Tanzania Ports Authority. (2023). *Annual statistics report 2022*. TPA.
21. The Citizen. (2023, June 6). Tanzania signs 30-year concession with DP World.
22. UNCTAD. (2021). *Review of maritime transport 2021*. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
23. World Bank. (2020). *Doing business 2020: Trading across borders*. World Bank.