Abstract

All through the ages, from antiquity to the contemporary period, the search for knowledge and its certainty has been the concern of many individuals. Both scientists, Philosophers, anthropologists, etc,have been concerned with this task, yet, the search is still on till now as it has proven to be a very problematic one. The problematic nature of knowledge and its certainty is evident in the various and contrasting positions individuals have taken as the basis for knowledge. Examples abound: For Pythagoras, it is mathematical axioms; for St. Augustine, it is faith; for Descartes, it is mathesis universalis; for Leibnz, it is logic; for CARNAP, it is protocol statement; for Russell and Aye, it is sense data while for C. L. Lewis, it is terminating judgement. In an attempt to contribute his quota to the search for knowledge and its certainty and as well put an end to the various theories and conflicting articulations in Philosophy, Husserl posited his phenomenology as an unimpeachable rationalistic basis for not only epistemology but the whole of Philosophy. This idea emanate from his deep conviction that there exist forgetfulness on the parts of philosophers before him to answer the disturbing questions of knowledge. Hence, they added more complications on the issue, thereby constituting what he referred to as epistemic naivety. Using both expository and evaluative method of qualitative research design, this paper aims to understand: (1) the success of Husserl's Phenomenology in removing man's prejudices in the way he claims to know the world and suspend his easy answers to fundamental questions (2) How it laid a new foundation for philosophy in the sense of strict science (3) How it places philosophy on a firm basis to overcome all presumptions, transcending to that which cannot be doubted. The discovery is that Husserl's Philosophy can be rightly called a deconstructive-constructive-democratic Philosophy. This is because just like democratic principles frowns at the imposition of someone else's will on another, or in practice, the imposition of the will of the Monarch or the Oligarch on the majority of the masses, the idea of "imposition" is something that is anti-phenomenology. In other words, the phenomena in the phenomenological attitude of patience forbearance must be allowed to show themselves as they are without "imposition" of any form of preconceptions, presuppositions, assumptions, prejudices or bias. It is only when this is done that apodeictic knowledge can be achieved. However, this paper claims that in practice, Husserl's phenomenological approach seems to be impossible and therefore renders his attempt at certainty of knowledge problematic. Hence, this paper is of the view that certitude or certainty in knowledge or having a conclusive knowledge remains problematic, yet, it is not a problem as such but a way of doing philosophy and advancing knowledge. Any attempt at having a conclusive knowledge in the sense that Husserl think of it will remain an exercise in futility since it would amount to the death of epistemology.

Keywords

  • Philosophy
  • Faith
  • Reason
  • Science
  • Thomas Aquinas

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